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EMERGENT DUALISM AND
THE CHALLENGE OF VAGUENESS
Igor Gasparov

In two recent papers, Dean Zimmerman has argued that the vagueness of
ordinary physical objects poses a challenge for “garden variety” materialism
(roughly, the view that the subject of conscious experiences is identical with
the brain or the whole human organism), and that emergent substance dualism can deal more successfully with the problem of vagueness. In this paper I
try to show that emergent dualism is vulnerable to the challenge of vagueness
to the same extent as is “garden variety” materialism.

1. Introduction
Dean Zimmerman has recently argued against “garden variety” materialism and in support of emergent substance dualism.1 Whereas garden
variety materialism claims that I am identical either to the whole human
organism that is my body or to one of the natural physical parts of my body,
such as the brain or nervous system, emergent substance dualism identifies
me, as a subject of conscious experiences, with an immaterial soul caused
by complex interactions among the physical parts of my brain.2 According
to Zimmerman, if you believe in the existence of phenomenal properties,
it is difficult to embrace garden variety materialism. Among entities suggested by garden variety materialism, no appropriate candidates for being
the subject of my conscious experiences “present themselves,”3 because
all “natural” material parts of my organism are vague. As Zimmerman
argues, a materialist intent on preserving belief in qualia must resort to
highly speculative forms of materialism. This fact in turn opens the door
for emergent dualism, because the speculations of the emergent dualist
are no more counter-intuitive than those of the speculative materialist. In
what follows I argue that Zimmerman’s emergent dualism is vulnerable

1
Dean W. Zimmerman, “From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism,” Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 84 (2010), 119–150; “From Experience to Experiencer,” in The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations in the Existence of the Soul, ed. M. Baker and S.
Goetz (New York: Continuum, 2011), 168–201.
2
The most elaborate account of emergent substance dualism is provided by William
Hasker in his The Emergent Self (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999).
3
Zimmerman, “From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism,” 145.
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to the very problem of vagueness that makes trouble for garden variety
materialism.4
2. Emergent Dualism and the Problem of Vagueness
To begin, consider the well-known example of a cloud.5 Imagine that you
observe a single cloud floating in a bright blue sky. As seen from the earth,
the cloud appears to be at most one. Upon a closer investigation, however,
it becomes apparent that some water droplets at the edges of the cloud are
neither clearly part of the cloud nor clearly not part of the cloud. Indeed,
there are many, largely overlapping, but nevertheless distinct aggregates
of water molecules each of which is an equally good candidate for being
the cloud you see in the sky. Given this, it’s natural to revise one’s belief
that there is a single cloud in the sky, and instead believe either that there
are no clouds in the sky (but only water molecules), or that there are many
distinct cloud-like objects in the sky. This may do for clouds, but what
about for ourselves? Clouds indeed are vague, but what about the person
who sees a cloud? If you believe yourself to be identical with at most one
person having now a conscious experience of a cloud, could you turn out
also to be just as vague as the cloud?
If you hold the view Dean Zimmerman has dubbed “garden variety
materialism,” your answer should be “yes.” On this view, each human
person is identical with an ordinary physical object, such as a human body
or brain. The difficulty, however, is that human bodies and brains are just
as vague as clouds and mountains. Suppose you are identical with your
brain. There is no one single thing that is your brain. Instead, where your
brain is supposed to be, there are many, largely overlapping brain-like
objects each of which is an equally good candidate for being your brain.
Which of them is you? It seems that there is no reason to prefer one of the
candidates over any of the others.
There are surely many ways of dealing with the problem of vagueness.
But for the sake of argument I accept here that Zimmerman is correct in
his reflections on the way vagueness raises a challenge for garden variety
materialism.6 If he is right, then this kind of materialism turns out indeed
to be a rather implausible account of human persons.
To get a clearer sense of the problem, assume there is a chair in your
vicinity. Chairs are admittedly vague, but that fact does not matter for
their ability to fulfill a precise function, namely to provide a place to sit.
4
It might be argued that even if emergent dualism is vulnerable to the vagueness problem
to the same extent as is garden variety materialism, emergent dualism would still be no
worse off than garden variety materialism. But, as far as I can see, Zimmerman’s point is
rather that emergent dualism should be back on the table precisely because garden variety
materialism suffers from a vagueness problem while emergent dualism does not. If it turns
out that emergent dualism suffers from problems of vagueness too, the motivation for emergent dualism which Zimmerman provides is undercut.
5
David Lewis, “Many, but Almost One,” in David Lewis, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 164.
6
Zimmerman, “From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism,” 139–140.
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Even after you have realized that there are many distinct chair-like objects
in front of you, you do not have to choose which of them to sit down
on. All of them are in nearly the same place, and are alike in all respects
relevant for sitting down and, hence, are equally good for serving the role
of a chair to sit on. In contrast, assume now that the brain is the ultimate
subject of your conscious experience. Thus, it possesses the first-person
perspective which is exclusively yours. Notice further that there are many
distinct brain-like things in the vicinity of your skull, each of which is
an equally good candidate for being a brain. If a brain is the subject of
conscious experience and, hence, the bearer of a first-person perspective,
then each equally good candidate for being a brain should possess its own
first-person perspective. Then, however, the question naturally arises,
which of them is you? In other words, the difficulty is that each candidate
for being my brain will be a thinker on her own.7 Therefore, there are too
many thinkers where we would have expected just a single one, and there
is no way to decide which of them is identical with you. This is a problem
for those who would like to identify a conscious person with the brain or
with the whole human organism.
Zimmerman contends that one can avoid this problem by adopting a
form of emergent substance dualism. Instead of identifying you with a
vague garden variety physical thing, emergent dualists hold that complex interactions among physical particles in your brain bring about the
existence of a new emergent individual that is the true subject of your
experience, i.e., is you. This new emergent individual cannot be identified
with any material object whatsoever, but is an immaterial counterpart to
your body, a soul.
Unfortunately, emergent dualists have to face the same problem as do
garden variety materialists.8 This seems to be so for the following reason.
Suppose there is a set, S, of physical particles interacting with each other
so as to jointly generate in a lawful manner an emergent soul, a. Further,
suppose that there is another set, S′, of physical particles most but not
all of which are members of S. S and S′ are largely over-lapping, equally
good candidates for being a brain, and so if S generates a soul, then S′
should too—call that soul b. Would a be identical to b? Prima facie there is
no reason why they should be identical. Distinct causes typically produce
distinct effects. Since a brain is vague, where we would normally think
7
In her critical evaluation of Zimmerman’s paper, Penelope Mackie also reaches the conclusion that Zimmerman’s account of vague “garden variety” objects entails the existence
of a multiplicity of thinkers: “[A] vague GVO [GVO is Mackie’s abbreviation for “garden
variety object”] can be a thinker only in virtue of the existence of a multiplicity of precise
candidates for being the GVO, all of which (or whom?) are thinkers.” (Penelope Mackie,
“Property Dualism and Substance Dualism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 [2011],
190n8.)
8
For the sake of simplicity I speak here only of emergent substance dualism. I think, however, that a similar criticism would apply to the non-dualist account of emergent individuals
provided by Timothy O’Connor and Jonathan D. Jacobs, “Emergent Individuals,” The Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003), 540–555.
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there is “the” brain, there are in fact many different (though largely overlapping) sets of particles each of which seems to be appropriate to generate
an emergent soul. Then, however, each such set would correspond to a
distinct emergent soul, since, according to the emergent dualist, emergent
souls are generated in a lawful manner, so that nothing could prevent
such a soul from arising if its natural cause is present. Thus, it appears
that there will be a great number of emergent souls associated with “your
brain.” Which one of them is yours? All are equally eligible for being you.
Emergent substance dualism seems to suffer from the vagueness problem
just as much as does garden variety materialism. I think that both garden
variety materialism and emergent dualism are in trouble here given the
strength of the intuition that one is the unique bearer of one’s own firstperson perspective and conscious experience.9
3. The Overdetermination Hypothesis
In two recent papers,10 Dean Zimmerman has proposed a way for the
emergent dualist to avoid the problem of vagueness, suggesting that, in
a situation of causal overdetermination, many overlapping sets of neural
events generate only one single soul:
I suppose that the following hypothesis is more likely: that many overlapping sets of events occur in the brain, none of which is the minimal cause of
the soul’s ongoing existence, nor the single cause of its overall phenomenal
state. With many overlapping patterns of neural firing, each lawfully sufficient for the existence of a soul with the same phenomenal states, there
could still be just one soul, its existence and phenomenal state simply overdetermined. There need be no vagueness about which activities in the brain
generate the subject of consciousness—in fact, on this supposition, many
precise (and largely overlapping) events are equally responsible—nor about
how many subjects there are.11

Zimmerman’s Overdetermination Hypothesis includes three main claims.
First, it denies that there is just one single cause for the existence of a soul.
Second, it supposes the existence of several distinct sets of largely overlapping neural events each of which is sufficient to produce an emergent
9
It might be objected that neither garden variety materialism nor emergent dualism
are substantially called into question by problems of vagueness. We continue to believe in
change despite the apparently strong arguments mounted by Zeno. Why then cannot we
still believe either garden variety materialism or emergent dualism even if there is an apparently strong argument against them? I think this analogy cannot be applied here since
the trouble with garden variety materialism and emergent dualism is that both, if the argument presented above is correct, undermine our basic conviction that we are the unique and
genuine subjects of our experience. Yes, we could be justified in holding some of our deep
and important beliefs despite there being some arguments against them. But I think that the
same is not true of our theories if they claim to account for one of our most basic intuitions
(such as the uniqueness of the subject of conscious experience) on the one hand, and yet on
the other entail a consequence which is incompatible with the very same basic intuition (as
the existence of many thinkers instead of just a single one seems to be).
10
See footnote 1.
11
Zimmerman, “From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism,” 146–147.
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soul in a lawful manner. And, third, it claims that the existence of just one
single emergent soul with its overall phenomenal state is overdetermined
by the totality of all these neural events. Vagueness is removed because
each neural event is precise and there is no question which set of such
events is the cause of the emergent soul. Since all neural events occurring
in a brain cause a single soul, there is no question about whose soul it
is. Thus, it appears that the Overdetermination Hypothesis would save
emergent dualism from the problem of vagueness. But let us examine the
issue more closely.
4. Some Troubles for the Overdetermination Hypothesis
Although the Overdetermination Hypothesis has its merits, it is also afflicted with some serious problems. There are at least two aspects that
are questionable. The first is that either Zimmerman’s appeal to overdetermination is ad hoc or a garden variety materialist could invoke it as well.
Indeed why should we suppose that many distinct and precise causes
yield just one precise effect, rather than many? Is there any reason that
convincingly speaks in favor of this supposition, beyond the need for a
single subject of conscious experience?
Consider the case when two or more bullets simultaneously do cause
just one single hole in a wall. At first glance, it appears in this case that
many distinct precise events jointly cause just a single event. The problem,
however, is that each of the distinct bullets would cause its own part of
the destruction in the wall. The talk of many bullets causing one hole is
imprecise. At the fundamental level each precise cause is related to its
own precise outcome. Applying this claim to a hypothetical process of
soul generation, it seems to follow that whenever there is a distinct precise
physical cause sufficient for the production of a soul, that cause should
yield its own precise outcome. Thus, many distinct precise brain processes
each lawfully sufficient for the generation of an emergent soul should and
presumably would produce many distinct souls rather than just one.12
Still, if one is willing to accept the Overdetermination Hypothesis, why
not say that many precise neural events overdetermine just one single
physical entity,—the brain*,—that is the unique bearer of the precise phenomenal properties? I don’t believe that this is a good idea in itself, but
if the overdetermination of the soul should be allowed, why shouldn’t
the overdetermination of its physical counterpart? It may be well asked:
what kind of entity is the brain* supposed to be? The materialist could
reply that even if nobody knows the precise way in which this new material thing comes into existence, it is a causal effect of many overlapping
12
The point here is not so much to deny the possibility of overdetermination as such. It
might possibly be the case that a set of physical particles shaped as a bust of Aristotle and the
bust itself, although they are two distinct entities, cause just one single effect. What I claim
here is that two different and not coinciding entities such as two different sets of neurons
could not cause just one single effect, if the effect in question is supposed to be non-vague. I
take it to be a conceptual matter, rather than a matter of probability.
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neural events which produce it by overdetermination. For this reason a
proponent of garden variety materialism could claim that the brain* is
neither vague nor identical to any of equally eligible candidates for being
the brain. Rather, it is a new, emergent entity, to be compared with the
(alleged) emergent soul in respect of its origin but purely physical. (Could
this count as a form of speculative materialism of which Zimmerman
speaks? I think not. As far as I understood Zimmerman, he claims that
speculative materialism should identify me with a precise part of a brain
which is to be discovered by scientific speculation.13 In contrast the account of the brain* is merely supposed to be a philosophical account of
what the brain (of ordinary discourse) in fact is.) So, I think, a proponent
of the Overdetermination Hypothesis is confronted with a dilemma:
Either she has to acknowledge that the overdetermination solution is ad
hoc or concede that a garden variety materialist may invoke it as well to
bolster her position.
Second, there seems to be another, more serious problem for the
Overdetermination Hypothesis, one that concerns the precise temporal
beginning of an emergent soul. According to the Overdetermination
Hypothesis, many overlapping patterns of neural firing causally overdetermine the existence of my soul. But patterns of neural firing can overlap
in time as well as in terms of the physical particles which they involve.
Because these patterns of neural firing contain so many constituent subevents (at the atomic or sub-atomic level), and because these processes are
unlikely to have clear-cut temporal beginnings or endings (times at which
we could say, the relevant process starts exactly now, and ends exactly
now), it is very likely that for any pattern of neural firing which is a good
candidate for being a pattern sufficient for the generation of a soul, there
will also be many other equally good candidates that begin or end slightly
earlier or slightly later.
But it appears that any emergent soul must necessarily have a beginning in time, because it is the result of natural causal processes occurring
over time. Moreover, an emergent soul, in order to be a non-vague entity,
should have a precise time of temporal beginning.14 Let t be the precise
time at which my emergent soul s began to exist. From this it would follow
that no neural activities sufficient to produce s occurred before t. But this
should strike us as very unlikely, for the reason given in the previous paragraph. Any pattern of neural firing which is a good candidate for being
“the first neural process to generate my soul” will likely be just one among
very many processes which have slightly different times of initiation or
Zimmerman, “From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism,” 143.
The material processes which (are supposed to) causally produce the soul are in time.
If a natural cause is in time, its natural effect must be in time as well. If emergent dualism is
true, then the soul must be produced in time as an effect of underlying physical processes. If
the soul is produced in time, then either there is a first moment at which the soul comes into
existence or the soul is temporally vague. Thus if the emergent soul has to be a non-vague
entity, then it must have a first moment of its existence.
13
14
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termination, but which are nonetheless equally good candidates for being
a process sufficient for the generation of a soul. If it was a problem for the
garden variety materialist that, at a single time, there are many equally
good candidates for “the physical object which is my brain,” then it should
be just as much of a problem for the emergent dualist that, occurring at
slightly different times, there are many equally good candidate processes
for “the neural process which first generates my soul.”
5. Conclusion
By way of conclusion, I want to emphasize that Zimmerman’s argument
presents a strong case against garden variety materialism. Yet, the emergent substance dualism which Zimmerman proposes is itself subject to
difficulties involving vagueness. In my view, the main reason for this is the
lawful causal dependence of the emergent soul on the physical processes
going on in the brain. This feature, which the emergent dualist believes
to be an advantage of her account, enabling her to include the soul in the
natural order, turns out instead to be a “Trojan horse” through which the
problem of vagueness casts its shadow on the emergent soul, making it
inappropriate for being the unique bearer of my conscious experience.15
Voronezh State Medical University

15
I’m grateful for helpful discussions on the material of this paper with Hans Halvorson,
Michael Loux, Michael Rota and Eleonore Stump at a Ratio project workshop in Moscow.
Many thanks also to the John Templeton Foundation for funding that workshop, and to
Thomas Flint and two anonymous referees from Faith and Philosophy for their insightful comments on earlier drafts.

